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Abstract
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems use a play-
back detector to filter out playback attacks and ensure ver-
ification reliability. Since current playback detection mod-
els are almost always trained using genuine and played-
back speech, it may be possible to degrade their perfor-
mance by transforming the acoustic characteristics of the
played-back speech close to that of the genuine speech. One
way to do this is to enhance speech “stolen” from the tar-
get speaker before playback. We tested the effectiveness of
a playback attack using this method by using the speech
enhancement generative adversarial network to transform
acoustic characteristics. Experimental results showed that
use of this “enhanced stolen speech” method significantly
increases the equal error rates for the baseline used in the
ASVspoof 2017 challenge and for a light convolutional neu-
ral network-based method. The results also showed that its
use degrades the performance of a Gaussian mixture model-
universal background model-based ASV system. This type
of attack is thus an urgent problem needing to be solved.
1. Introduction
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) [1], a kind of bio-
metrics authentication technology, identifies a person from
a segment of speech. ASV systems typically fall into two
types: text-independent and text-dependent, where the lat-
ter requests a client to speak a given phrase. Due to the
convenience of ASV, it is being used in more and more ap-
plications, such as ones used in call centers and by mobile
devices. However, ASV is vulnerable to several kinds of
spoofing attacks (also known as presentation attacks [2]),
so ASV systems need a spoofing countermeasure (CM)
(also known as presentation attack detection [2]). Such
attacks aim to mimic the target speaker mainly by using
synthesized speech [3], converted speech [3], or playback
speech [4, 5]. Among them, playback speech-based attacks
are relatively easy to mount since an attacker who has no
special knowledge can make them [6]. Once an attacker
has collected/stolen a voice sample for the target speaker,
he/she can simply play it back to an ASV system or con-
catenate segments of the sample to form a new utterance.
Threats from this kind of attack have been confirmed by
several studies [4, 5, 7, 8, 9]. Here we focus on playback
spoofing attacks and relevant CMs.
Four main types of CMs have been developed to pro-
tect against playback spoofing attacks. One type utilizes
a text-dependent ASV system and randomly prompts for a
pass-phrase [10, 11], making it difficult to mount playback
attacks using phrase-fixed speech. However, it is possible
to form an arbitrary utterance to spoof this type of CM if
the attacker has sufficient speech data for the target speaker.
The second type is based on rules describing the characteris-
tics of genuine speech (recorded from a person). For exam-
ple, Mochizuki et al. [12] distinguished genuine speech by
detecting pop-noise from certain phonemes. An intractable
problem related to this type of CM is that it is difficult to
design suitable rules and implement them. The third type
utilizes audio fingerprinting to check whether an incoming
recording is similar to previously authenticated utterances
that were automatically saved in the ASV system. Ro-
driguez et al. [13] developed such a system: if the simi-
larity score was higher than a threshold, the recording was
treated as a playback attack. A disadvantage of this type of
CM is that it is sensitive to noise. In contrast, the fourth type
compares the differences between genuine speech and play-
back speech. This type mainly utilizes a machine learning
algorithm to learn the differences. An example is Wang et
al.’s [14] use of a support vector machine [15] to learn the
difference in Mel-frequency cepstral coefficient (MFCC)-
based acoustic features.
More methods of the fourth type were presented at the
second Automatic Speaker Verification Spoofing and Coun-
termeasures Challenge (ASVspoof 2017), in which a com-
mon database was used to assess the participants’ CMs. The
database consists of two parts. One part contains genuine
speech taken from the RedDots corpus [16], which was
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Figure 1. Playback spoofing attack using enhanced stolen speech
method under ASVspoof 2017 scenario. Without speech enhance-
ment, attack is the same as a conventional playback attack.
designed for speaker verification. The other part contains
recordings of the genuine speech made in various environ-
ments. For these data, the baseline [4] with a constant
Q cepstral coefficient (CQCC) [17] feature and a Gaus-
sian mixture model (GMM) classifier had an equal error
rate (EER) of 30.60%. A deep learning-based method had
an EER of 6.73% [18], which was the best performance
achieved at ASVspoof 2017 [4].
These mainstream CMs of the fourth type are also prob-
lematic: they are based on the assumption that the attack-
ers do not have special knowledge. Moreover, this type
of CM algorithms only learn the difference from a given
dataset and perhaps do not work well if the acoustic charac-
teristics of the playback speech is transformed close to that
of the genuine one. To confirm this hypothesis, we tested
the effectiveness of a playback attack using speech “stolen”
from the target speaker and enhanced before mounting the
attack. This enhancement should remove the distortions in
the stolen speech caused by the recording device and envi-
ronmental noise so that they do not affect the re-recorded
speech.
We evaluated the effectiveness of a playback attack us-
ing this enhanced stolen speech method against a text-
dependent ASV system. We used the ASVspoof 2017 sce-
nario (Figure 1) in which the attacker is assumed to ob-
tain from somewhere uncompressed speech for the target
speaker containing the phrase used for authentication, e.g.,
by downloading from the web, hacking a device used by the
target speaker, and talking to and surreptitiously recording
the target speaker. The speech enhancement generative ad-
versarial network (SEGAN) [19] was used to transform the
acoustic characteristics of the obtained speech close to that
of the genuine speech. We also investigated the effect of dif-
ferent types of playback loudspeakers and re-recording de-
vices. The results showed that it is possible to fool playback
spoofing CMs by transforming the acoustic characteristic of
the playback speech close to that of the genuine speech.
2. Related work
Pioneering work on playback attacks was reported by
Lindberg and Blomberg in 1999 [20]. They pre-recorded
the numbers one to ten of two speakers and then con-
catenated various combinations of them to attack a hid-
den Markov model (HMM) [21]-based text-dependent ASV
system. They demonstrated considerable increase in both
the EER and false acceptance rate (FAR) compared to ver-
ification without attacks. More recently, Ergunay et al. in-
vestigated the effect of playback attacks against ASV sys-
tems and also achieved a large increase in FAR [22]. Com-
pared to these conventional playback attacks, our method
further degrades the performance of playback spoofing CMs
by enhancing the speech.
There are a few attack methods similar to our enhanced
stolen speech method. Demiroglu et al. improved the natu-
ralness of synthesized and converted speech before attack-
ing a phase-based synthetic speech detector and an ASV
system [23]. The synthesized and converted speech sig-
nals were firstly analyzed frame by frame, and each frame
was replaced with one containing the most similar natu-
ral speech selected from a dataset. A complex cepstrum
vocoder was used to re-synthesize these frames so as to
improve speech naturalness. Finally, the speech was di-
rectly fed into an ASV system. They reported that their
method fooled four out of nine detectors. Our method can
be thought of as an extension of their method as it further
transforms synthesized speech close to natural speech.
Nguyen et al. reported an attack method that transforms
computer-generated (CG) images into natural images be-
fore feeding them into a facial authentication system [24].
The transformation model is trained using a generative ad-
versarial network (GAN) [25]. The GAN discriminator,
which mimics a spoofing detector, is used to distinguish
CG/natural images. The discriminator is pre-trained and
fixed during training of the transformation model. In con-
trast, we treat the authentication system as a black box, and
anything regarding playback spoofing CMs and ASV sys-
tems is unknown.
3. Playback detectors and ASV system
Two playback spoofing CMs and a classical Gaussian
mixture model with universal background model (GMM-
UBM) [26]-based ASV system were used to evaluate the
effectiveness of our enhanced stolen speech attack method.
The two CMs were the baseline and the core method of the
system with the best performance (i.e., a light convolutional
neural network) of ASVspoof 2017.
3.1. Baseline of ASVspoof 2017
The baseline of ASVspoof 2017 consists of a CQCC
front-end and a GMM back-end. We refer to this method
as “CQCC-GMM CM”. The CQCC is an acoustic feature
extracted from an audio signal. CQCC extraction is per-
formed using constant Q transform (CQT) instead of the
classical short-time Fourier transformation (STFT). STFT
suffers from fixed frequency resolution and fixed temporal
resolution whereas CQT exhibits higher frequency resolu-
tion at lower frequencies and higher temporal resolution at
higher frequencies. An audio signal is usually represented
by a sequence of CQCC feature vectors.
A two-class GMM-based classifier is used for gen-
uine/playback speech detection. One GMM is trained us-
ing genuine speech while the other one is trained using
playback speech. Input to the GMMs is CQCC-based
acoustic feature vectors, and the expectation maximization
(EM) [27] algorithm is used for training. During prediction,
the feature vectors of an audio signal are independently in-
put into the two models, and then the joint log-likelihood
for both models is calculated. Finally, the log-likelihood ra-
tio of the genuine and playback model results is compared
with a threshold to determine genuine/playback speech.
3.2. Core method of best system of ASVspoof 2017
The best system of ASVspoof 2017 was a fusion of three
sub-systems: a support vector machine with i-vector fea-
tures [28], a convolutional neural network (CNN) with a
recurrent neural network (RNN), and a light CNN (LCNN).
The LCNN was used as the core method, which achieved
an EER of 7.37%. This performance was very close to that
of the fused system (6.73%). We therefore used an “LCNN
CM” to evaluate our enhanced stolen speech attack method.
The LCNN consists of five convolution layers, four
network-in-network (NIN) [29] layers, ten max-feature-
map (MFM) layers, five max-pooling layers, and two fully
connected layers. Each MFM layer acts as a maxout activa-
tion function [30] that splits the CNN feature maps into two
groups and then performs element-wise maximization to se-
lect features. The LCNN input is a spectrum with a fixed
size of 864 × 400, which is obtained by performing STFT
with 1728 bins and concatenating 400 frames. Dropout [31]
is applied after the first fully connected layer. The final
output layer, with a softmax activation function, is used to
discriminate genuine/playback speech. This is described in
more detail elsewhere [18].
The silence parts of the audio signal are removed, and
then STFT is performed using a window length of 25 ms
with a shift size of 10 ms. If a signal is shorter than 4
seconds, its content is repeated to match the length. For
a longer signal, its content is repeated to match multiples of
4 seconds, and the output probabilities are averaged.
3.3. GMM-UBM-based ASV system
We use a GMM-UBM-based system for speaker verifica-
tion. Even though it is a classic ASV method, GMM-UBM
provides competitive performance on short-duration, text-
dependent ASV tasks [32]. The speaker models are created
by maximum a posteriori adaptation from a UBM trained
with a large amount of speech data from different speakers.
Text-dependent speaker models are separately created for
different passphrases following the guidelines for conduct-
ing experiments with the RedDots corpus. The recognition
score is the likelihood ratio between the results of the target
speaker model and those of the UBM.
ෝ𝒚
𝒄𝒛
𝒙
Gdecoder
Gencoder
𝒙
1
𝒚
D
𝒙
0
ෝ𝒚
D
Figure 2. Architecture of SEGAN. Input of discriminator is (y,x)
or (yˆ,x); the former should be classified as real data while the
latter should be classified as fake data; but the latter should be
treated as real data when updating the generator parameters, so
adversarial training is performed.
4. Speech enhancement
SEGAN is a data-driven speech enhancement method
that constructs a mapping from a noisy waveform to a clean
waveform with the help of supervised training. More specif-
ically, SEGAN leverages the power of the GAN composed
of two adversarial networks, a discriminator D and a gen-
erator G. The discriminator predicts the probability that the
input is from real data rather than from fake data gener-
ated by G. The generator learns a mapping function from
a prior noise distribution pnoise(z) to the distribution of the
real data pdata(y) to fool the discriminator. If the noise dis-
tribution is conditioned by x drawn from playback speech
and y drawn from genuine speech, the output yˆ is genuine-
like speech.
The objective function for training SEGAN is formulated
as
min
D
L(D) = 1
2
Ey∼pdata(y)[(D(y,x)− 1)2]
+
1
2
Ez∼pnoise(z)[D(yˆ,x)
2]
min
G
L(G) = Ez∼pnoise(z)[(D(yˆ,x)− 1)2]
+ λ· ‖ yˆ − y ‖1, (1)
where yˆ = G(z,x) is enhanced (or generated) speech and
E means expectation. L1 norm, ‖ · ‖1, is used to measure
the distance between the real and enhanced speech. The
discriminator and generator are alternately trained by per-
forming a min-max game.
Figure 2 shows the architecture of SEGAN. It is an end-
to-end model, so both the input and output of the generator
are raw waveforms. The input of the discriminator is also
a raw waveform combining (y,x) or (yˆ,x). The generator
has an encoder-decoder structure. The encoder part is com-
posed of 11 stacked 1-D CNN layers with a filter width of
31 and a stride of two. The decoder part is a mirror structure
of the encoder part, and the corresponding layers between
them are connected by a skip path. The dimension of noise
z is the same as that of encoder output c and is drawn from a
normal distribution. They are concatenated and input to the
decoder. The architecture of the discriminator is the same as
that of the encoder part of the generator except that virtual
batch-normalization [33] is performed in hidden layers.
5. Database
In this section, we describe the speech data used for
training the spoofing detectors, ASV, and SEGAN. We also
describe the test data used for authentic as well as illegiti-
mate access.
5.1. Training data for playback spoofing CM
Both the CQCC-GMM and the LCNN CM models were
trained using the ASVspoof 2017 database (version 2),
which was derived from the RedDots corpus. The gen-
uine speech data in the database was taken from the Red-
Dots corpus, and the playback speech data was recorded
by playing the genuine speech data in various environments
(including quiet and noisy places) using various recording
devices and speakers with various qualities. The sampling
rate was 16 kHz for both the genuine and playback speech.
The database was further split into three datasets: train-
ing, development, and evaluation. Each of the datasets con-
tained both genuine and playback speech. The GMM of the
CQCC-GMM CM was trained using the training and devel-
opment datasets. For the LCNN, the training dataset was
used to estimate the model parameters and the development
dataset was used to monitor the training process.
5.2. Training data for ASV system
We used TIMIT and RSR2015 (background subset [34])
corpora for training the UBM for the GMM-UBM-based
ASV system. Only male speakers were used as the
ASVspoof 2017 database was created from the male sub-
set of the RedDots corpus. In total, we used 17,850 speech
utterances from 488 speakers for UBM training. Each tar-
get speaker model was created with speech utterances from
three different sessions for a fixed passphrase.
5.3. Training data for SEGAN
We used a high-quality database and two low-quality
databases distorted by recording devices or environment
noises to train SEGAN. The high-quality database was the
voice cloning toolkit (VCTK) corpus [35]. This corpus con-
tains data recorded in a hemi-anechoic chamber by 109 na-
tive English speakers, but we used data for only 28 speak-
ers. One of the low-quality databases was a device-recorded
VCTK (DR-VCTK) corpus [36] and the other one was a
noisy VCTK (N-VCTK) corpus [37]. The DR-VCTK was
created by playing the high-quality speech of the 28 speak-
ers in office environments and recording it using relatively
inexpensive consumer devices. The N-VCTK was created
by adding noise to the high-quality speech of the 28 speak-
ers. The sampling rate of these databases was 48 kHz
with downsampling to 16 kHz. Two types of SEGAN were
trained. One was trained using DR-VCTK and VCTK. The
other was trained using N-VCTK and VCTK.
5.4. Authentication and spoofing data
We equally split the genuine speech of the evalua-
tion dataset in the ASVspoof 2017 database into two sub-
datasets. One was used as authentication speech, and
the other was used as “stolen speech.” We enhanced the
stolen speech, played it using four types of portable loud-
speakers, and re-recorded it using six types of record-
ing devices in an office room. The four loudspeakers
were a high-quality speaker (BOSE Soundlink), a medium-
quality speaker (SONY SRS-BTS50), a low-quality speaker
(audio-technica AT-SP92), and an iPhone 6s speaker. The
six recording devices were a high-quality condenser micro-
phone (Apogee MiC 96k), a directional microphone (Sony
ECM–673), a low-quality microphone (Snowball iCE), a
MacBook microphone, an iPad microphone, and an iPhone
6s microphone. These devices were placed at around 30 to
50 cm from the loudspeaker. The sampling rate for the re-
recording was 16 kHz. According to the used loudspeaker,
four playback and re-recording sessions were performed.
6. Experimental setup
We evaluated 1) how our enhanced stolen speech method
affects the performance of playback spoofing CMs and 2)
how the enhanced speech effects an ASV system. In order
to compare the difference between our method and conven-
tional playback attacks, a paired two-tailed t-test was used.
6.1. Setup for playback spoofing CMs
Settings of the CQCC-GMM CM were the same as base-
line of ASVspoof 2017 and the source code is available
at [38]. CQCC had 29 dimension and 0-th order cepstral
coefficient was further used. Their first and second deriva-
tives were finally used as features (90 dimensions in total).
The GMM of the CQCC-GMM CM had 512 components.
The weights of the LCNN were initialized using the
Xavier method [39]. The dropout rate was set to 0.5. Adam
optimization [40] with momentum of 0.5 was used. The
initial learning rate was 0.0001; it was reduced by 0.9 if
the classification accuracy of the development dataset de-
creased after each epoch. There were nine epochs, and the
mini-batch size was 64. The LCNN was implemented using
the TensorFlow framework [41] and is available at [42].
To assess the performance of both spoofing CMs, we use
EER, which reflects the ability of the CM to discriminate
genuine speech samples from playback attacks.
6.2. Setup for ASV system
Our ASV system used MFCC-based acoustic feature ex-
tracted from a 20 ms short-term window with a 10 ms shift
using 20 filters. We computed 19 MFCCs after discard-
ing the energy coefficients. The MFCCs were further pro-
cessed with RASTA filtering to suppress convolutive mis-
match. The delta and double-delta coefficients were com-
puted for a context of three frames and then augmented with
static MFCCs to create a 57-dimensional feature vector. Fi-
nally, cepstral mean and variance normalization (CMVN)
was performed after discarding the non-speech frames with
an energy-based voice activity detector. We trained the
gender-dependent UBM with 512 mixture components. The
Table 1. EERs for CQCC-GMM CM. Bold means largest degradation.
Loudspeaker Enhancement Directional High-quality Low-quality Mac iPad iPhone Averageused for replay training data microphone microphone microphone book 6s
High quality
− 15.65 8.83 20.87 9.98 7.21 49.92 18.74
DR-VCTK 28.42 18.10 29.67 14.96 8.59 50.00 24.96
N-VCTK 35.61 23.18 33.59 16.49 9.17 50.00 28.01
Medium quality
− 9.35 11.96 8.78 10.78 6.54 49.13 16.09
DR-VCTK 15.71 20.16 15.76 15.27 7.43 49.92 20.71
N-VCTK 22.56 25.62 22.03 15.61 8.36 49.92 24.02
Low quality
− 11.83 8.98 10.28 8.34 6.14 49.92 15.92
DR-VCTK 20.07 16.29 19.77 10.32 6.96 49.96 20.56
N-VCTK 26.87 22.35 24.44 10.78 7.35 49.92 23.62
iPhone 6s
− 16.28 16.54 19.83 7.19 6.40 49.53 19.30
DR-VCTK 30.45 31.19 30.50 10.93 7.14 49.92 26.69
N-VCTK 24.25 24.26 26.94 9.83 7.28 49.88 23.74
Table 2. EERs for LCNN CM. Bold means largest degradation.
Loudspeaker Enhancement Directional High-quality Low-quality Mac iPad iPhone Averageused for replay training data microphone microphone microphone book 6s
High quality
− 11.19 8.00 16.14 7.71 12.95 25.04 13.51
DR-VCTK 12.35 9.12 18.14 8.59 13.55 25.74 14.58
N-VCTK 13.48 10.43 19.74 8.85 13.83 25.29 15.27
Medium quality
− 8.78 9.98 5.92 5.47 7.09 25.25 10.42
DR-VCTK 9.57 11.22 6.56 6.85 8.79 27.25 11.71
N-VCTK 10.31 12.22 7.96 7.23 9.56 27.12 12.40
Low quality
− 7.25 6.06 5.31 9.52 7.80 16.29 8.71
DR-VCTK 8.44 7.10 6.07 10.08 8.76 17.05 9.58
Noisy VCTK 10.23 8.95 7.52 10.30 9.38 17.09 10.58
iPhone 6s
− 11.11 11.56 10.47 4.40 9.17 17.65 10.73
DR-VCTK 13.25 14.97 13.62 5.23 11.12 18.26 12.74
N-VCTK 11.70 12.33 11.21 4.54 10.07 18.07 11.32
speaker models were created by adapting only the centers of
UBM with a relevance factor of three.
Even though ASV spoofing evaluations have focused
on standalone CM assessment, the performance of a tan-
dem (combined) system is important for real-world deploy-
ment. Both CM and ASV can result in target speaker misses
and false acceptances of impostors (either non-targets or
spoofs). We therefore adopted a recently proposed tandem
detection cost function (t-DCF) metric [43] for evaluating
the combination of two systems in a Bayes risk framework.
The t-DCF is given by Casvmiss · pitar ·Pa+Casvfa · pinon ·Pb+
Ccmfa · pispoof ·Pc +Ccmmiss · pitar ·Pd, where Casvmiss = 1, Casvfa
= 10, Ccmfa = 10, and C
cm
miss = 1 are unit costs related to the
misses and false alarms of the two systems; pispoof = 0.0100,
pinon = 0.0099, and pitar = 0.9801 were the prior probabili-
ties of the targets, non-targets, and spoofs, respectively; and
Pa, Pb, Pc, and Pd are the error rates of four possible er-
rors originating from the joint actions of the CM and ASV
systems. The reported t-DCF values are minimum t-DCF
values with a fixed ASV system. The higher the value, the
less usable the combined (ASV and CM) system.
6.3. Setup for SEGAN
Similar to previous work [19, 44], we extracted chunks
of waveforms by using a sliding window of 214 samples at
every 213 samples (i.e., 50% overlap). During testing, we
concatenated the results at the end of the stream without
overlap. The learning rate, mini-batch size, and epoch size
were set to 0.0002, 100, and 120, respectively. The λ in
Equation 1 was set to 100. We used source code for im-
proved SEGAN [45].
7. Results
Tables 1 and 2 show the EERs for the CQCC-GMM CM
and the LCNN CM, respectively. Playback spoofing attacks
using our enhanced stolen speech method had significantly
higher EERs for both CMs compared to those of conven-
tional playback attacks (without enhancement). One rea-
son could be that the signal-to-noise ratio was higher af-
ter speech enhancement, resulting in the playing of cleaner
speech. Use of the high-quality speaker with the high-
quality microphone and use of the low-quality speaker with
the high-quality microphone when N-VCTK was used to
train SEGAN resulted in the largest performance degrada-
Table 3. Values of t-DCF obtained from combination of CQCC-GMM CM and ASV scores. Bold means largest degradation.
Loudspeaker Enhancement Directional High-quality Low-quality Mac iPad iPhone Averageused for replay training data microphone microphone microphone book 6s
High quality
− 0.9361 0.9276 0.9392 0.9136 0.9118 0.9426 0.9285
DR-VCTK 0.9412 0.9363 0.9410 0.9258 0.9210 0.9426 0.9347
N-VCTK 0.9403 0.9373 0.9402 0.9277 0.9211 0.9431 0.9350
Medium quality
− 0.9156 0.9351 0.9211 0.9222 0.9039 0.9425 0.9234
DR-VCTK 0.9313 0.9386 0.9348 0.9311 0.9143 0.9428 0.9322
N-VCTK 0.9339 0.9377 0.9362 0.9308 0.9186 0.9429 0.9334
Low quality
− 0.9225 0.9177 0.9248 0.9109 0.9020 0.9415 0.9199
DR-VCTK 0.9339 0.9314 0.9362 0.9220 0.9076 0.9428 0.9290
N-VCTK 0.9353 0.9342 0.9363 0.9223 0.9105 0.9425 0.9302
iPhone 6s
− 0.9354 0.9358 0.9379 0.9085 0.9006 0.9384 0.9261
DR-VCTK 0.9380 0.9379 0.9388 0.9290 0.9127 0.9381 0.9324
N-VCTK 0.9387 0.9391 0.9383 0.9247 0.9100 0.9388 0.9316
Table 4. Values of t-DCF obtained from combination of LCNN CM and ASV scores. Bold means largest degradation.
Loudspeaker Enhancement Directional High-quality Low-quality Mac iPad iPhone Averageused for replay training data microphone microphone microphone book 6s
High quality
− 0.9239 0.9073 0.9436 0.9063 0.9338 0.9656 0.9301
DR-VCTK 0.9303 0.9135 0.9494 0.9098 0.9385 0.9664 0.9347
N-VCTK 0.9346 0.9186 0.9522 0.9105 0.9390 0.9658 0.9368
Medium quality
− 0.9105 0.9173 0.8990 0.8978 0.9038 0.9657 0.9157
DR-VCTK 0.9159 0.9266 0.9011 0.9021 0.9107 0.9673 0.9206
N-VCTK 0.9202 0.9293 0.9077 0.9035 0.9143 0.9675 0.9238
Low quality
− 0.9043 0.8992 0.8972 0.9122 0.9070 0.9584 0.9131
DR-VCTK 0.9105 0.9029 0.8999 0.9156 0.9125 0.9605 0.9170
N-VCTK 0.9183 0.9108 0.9051 0.9156 0.9141 0.9593 0.9205
iPhone 6s
− 0.9208 0.9238 0.9173 0.8952 0.9120 0.9530 0.9204
DR-VCTK 0.9344 0.9396 0.9345 0.8970 0.9222 0.9540 0.9303
N-VCTK 0.9234 0.9274 0.9214 0.8960 0.9154 0.9559 0.9233
tion for the two CMs. The increases in EER were 2.6 and
1.5 times, respectively.
As expected, use of the high-quality speaker resulted in
higher EERs because it generated more natural speech. It
is interesting that the results for the iPhone 6s speaker were
similar to those for the high-quality speaker. While a wide
range of EERs were obtained for the recording devices,
use of the high-quality microphone did not result in signif-
icantly higher EERs. The CQCC-GMM CM could not dis-
tinguish the playback speech re-recorded using the iPhone
6s. This was because features were not normalized and
channel distortions greatly degraded its performance [5].
Enhancement based on the N-VCTK was mightier than that
based on the DR-VCTK in most cases. This might be be-
cause distortion due to environmental noise has a greater
effect than that due to the recording devices.
Tables 3 and 4 show the t-DCF values for the combined
CQCC-GMM CM and GMM-UBM-based ASV scores and
for the combined LCNN CM and GMM-UBM-based ASV
scores, respectively. Compared to the conventional play-
back attacks, an attack using our enhanced stolen speech
method greatly degraded the authentication performance of
both combinations. This suggests that our enhanced stolen
speech method enables playback attacks to pass playback
spoofing CMs and to fool ASV systems as well.
8. Conclusion and future work
We investigated the effectiveness of using enhanced
stolen speech in playback spoofing attacks. Experimental
results showed that stolen speech enhanced with SEGAN
can greatly degrade the performances of baseline CQCC-
GMM and advanced LCNN-based playback spoofing CMs
as well as that of GMM-UBM-based ASV systems.
Since the used speech enhancement method for attack
would be unknown, we plan to develop a robust playback
detection method for various speech enhancement methods.
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